



Chapter 7: Addressing the Distractive Aftermath of Collective Conflicts – A Three-Fold Model ¹²

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Abstract

Intractable conflicts are prevalent worldwide, causing severe damage to the rival parties. Even when these conflicts are resolved by signing peace agreements, without proper attention to this damage, these conflicts can re-erupt. To prevent this, the current article describes - based on a literature review - an inclusive model that integrates three main processes that heal this damage (active reconciliation, passive reconciliation and self-healing) while discussing their interconnections and implications in promoting sustainable peace. Some of the main topics that are addressed are third party involvement, mutual positive impacts of the three processes, why the model is "inclusive" and "integrated", the difficulties in initiating the three processes, the sequence of their initiation, parallel practice of the three processes, the impact of the three processes on signing a peace agreement and the applicability of the model also to other types of collective violence (other than conflicts).

1. Introduction

1.1. Intractable conflicts and their damage

Intractable conflicts are characterized as being violent, relatively long and addressing topics of major importance to the rival parties. Such conflicts are prevalent worldwide; some **contemporary** examples include the Israeli-Palestinian, the Sudanese and the Syrian conflicts, while **less contemporary** examples, though still relevant to this article, include the 1990s conflict in the

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Balkans, and the 1937-1945 Sino-Japanese and 1939-1945 Korean-Japanese wars. All of these conflicts have had a very destructive aftermath: They have caused severe, wide-scale damage to the involved parties.¹³ This damage – typically affecting the militarily weaker party more seriously, though not exclusively – occurs in four major domains of the parties: social, economic, political, and psychological.¹⁴

A. **Social** - Damage in this domain may take different forms. For example, in **intra**-state conflicts (i.e., civil wars), the social order is shattered, crime is prevalent, and social hegemony between groups or generations can be challenged. Differently, in **inter**-state conflicts, some aspects of the war (e.g., the justification for fighting or the morality of the in-group army's conduct) may cause social rifts within each party.¹⁵

B. **Economic** - The enormous investment demanded by intractable conflicts embodies an economic burden on the involved parties, while the conflicts cause enormous damage to parties' surroundings and infrastructure.¹⁶

C. **Political** - This domain is affected mostly in intra-state conflicts, since the regime, its institutions and procedures are challenged and often shattered.¹⁷

D. **Psychological** - Members of the **weaker** party often exhibit posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), collective low self-esteem and dysphoric emotions such as fear, hate, rage, and desire for revenge.¹⁸ They also typically experience feelings of guilt for surviving when their loved ones have died, a sense of injustice and a perception of the world as threatening. Feelings of lack of control over their lives (learned helplessness) may also be exhibited, in addition to a heightened

¹³ Deutsch, M. (2008). Reconciliation after destructive intergroup conflict. In A. Nadler, T. Malloy, and J. Fisher (eds.), *Social psychology of intergroup reconciliation: From violent conflict to peaceful co-existence* (pp. 471-485). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁴ Fuertes, A. B. (2004). In their own words: Contextualizing the discourse of (war) trauma and healing. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 21, 491-501.

¹⁵ Whittaker, D. (1999). *Conflict and reconciliation in the contemporary world*. London and New-York: Routledge.

¹⁶ Whittaker, 1999.

¹⁷ Bar-Siman-Tov, Y. (2004). Dialectics between stable peace and reconciliation. In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov, ed., *From conflict resolution to reconciliation* (pp. 61- 80). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ Ross, G. (2003). *Beyond the trauma vortex*. California: Berkeley.

need for physical and psychological security.¹⁹ For the **stronger** party, some of its members might also feel some of the abovementioned symptoms of the weaker party, although at times to a lesser degree, or these symptoms are less prevalent among its members.²⁰ Both **weaker and stronger parties** possess a biased collective memory of the conflict, one which typically and unrealistically portrays themselves very positively and their rivals very negatively in the context of the conflict.²¹

1.2. The need to address the conflict damage

Once the conflicts are resolved by signing peace agreements, they reach the “post conflict” phase. It is typically then that the conflict damage should be mainly properly addressed in order to heal relations between/reconcile the rival parties and promote sustainable peace.²² After all, how can sustainable peace exist if, for example, a rival party holds such negative emotions or memories toward its rival (**psychological damage**)? Or, as one mother from Rwanda explained, she cannot forgive the perpetrators who killed members of her family in the 1994 genocide while her son is still hungry (**economic damage**).²³ Additionally, addressing these damages ameliorates the parties' situation and wellbeing, an important aim in itself – although **the focus of this article is on promoting sustainable peace**.²⁴

2. Three processes for addressing the damage

Three main processes are discussed in the scholarly literature as being used and as should be used, to address this damage: active reconciliation, passive reconciliation and self-healing²⁵.

¹⁹ Cemalcilar, Z., Canbeyli, R., and Sunar, D. (2003). Learned Helplessness, Therapy and personality traits: An experimental study. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 14, 65-81; Staub, E. (2011). *Overcoming evil: Genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁰ Swim, J., and Miller, D. (1999). White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes toward affirmative action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25, 500-514.

²¹ Nets-Zehngut, R. (2014). The Israeli and Palestinian collective memories of their conflict: Comparing their characteristics, determinants and implications. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 20 (2), 103-121.

²² This chapter differentiates between “peace” (signing an agreement that ends the conflict) and “sustainable peace” (largely, keeping that agreement for a long time, or forever).

²³ Bar-Tal, D. (2013). *Intractable conflict: Socio-Psychological foundations and dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

²⁴ However, as we will see, there is a connection between amelioration of the parties' situation and the promotion of sustainable peace – the existence of the former increases the chances that the latter will take place.

²⁵ The process termed in this chapter “Self-Healing Process – SHP” is identical to the “Collective Self-Healing Process – CSHP” discussed in chapter 6 of this book.

2.1. Active Reconciliation Process (ARP)

This reconciliation process (discussed above in part 2 of the current book) is considered the **central** method for addressing the described damage.²⁶ It consists of collaborative activities related to the conflict practiced by **both** rival parties **with the purpose** of advancing their mutual reconciliation; i.e., to heal their relations. Such activities include, for example, an apology expressed by the perpetrator and accepted by the victim, revising history textbooks via joint historians' commissions, cultural exchanges, operating truth and reconciliation committees, and reparations paid by the perpetrator. These activities – and similar processes with different titles: **transitional justice** and **peace building** processes – have been practiced extensively worldwide in the past few decades in numerous instances. Examples include the 1993 Kono apology by Japan to the people of Korea on the issue of World War II comfort women, over 40 historian commissions (e.g., the mid-1990s German-Czech Commission of Historians), massive cultural exchanges between Germany and France some time after the end of World War II, and over 30 truth and reconciliation committees (the most famous of them, operating in the mid-1990s in South Africa).²⁷

This process has an **active** aspect, since the former rivals **actively** seek reconciliation, and that is its aim. Thus, in the literature, this process has been called an “**active reconciliation process**” (ARP).²⁸

2.2. Passive Reconciliation Process (PRP)

In this process (discussed above in part 3 of the current book), **both** former rival parties collaborate for their own instrumental reasons, *not* related to the conflict (e.g., environmental, economic, and health), but as a **by-product** of this cooperation, their relations ameliorate. This process is based on two of the most influential theories in intergroup relations: Morton Deutsch's theory of

²⁶ Barkan, E., and Barkey, K. (2016). *Choreography of sacred spaces: State, religion and conflict resolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.

²⁷ Bar-Tal, 2013; Lederach, P. (2014). *Reconcile: Conflict transformation for ordinary Christians*. Harrisonburg: Herald Press; Staub 2011.

²⁸ Nets-Zehngut, R. (2008). Passive reconciliation in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In G. Ben-Porat (ed.), *Implementing peace agreements: Israel-Palestine, South Africa and Northern Ireland* (pp. 178-194). New York: Palgrave-McMillan; Nets-Zehngut, R. (2009). Passive reconciliation of the aftermath of intractable conflicts. *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, 14 (1), 39-60.

cooperation and competition, and Gordon Allport's contact hypothesis.²⁹ According to Deutsch, when the goals of two parties are "positively interdependent", the parties are motivated to engage in "effective actions" (i.e., actions that improve the parties' chances of achieving their goals). Allport also views the parties' common goals as essential for the initiation of cooperation – whereas the contact between the parties in many cases improves their relations. This improvement is an outcome of the collaboration that promotes effective and open communication between the parties, perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, friendliness and helpful attitudes, and a sense of basic similarity and willingness to enhance the other's capabilities. This collaboration also promotes more differentiated views of the other party's members, indicating possible similarities of interests, values and goals, and exposes people to various neutral or positive aspects of their rivals that are unrelated to the conflict (e.g., culture, language, and food).

A wide discussion of this process in the literature, offers, among other things, a typology of collaborative activities differentiating between:³⁰ a) **Permanent vs. ad hoc cooperation** - Examples of the former being the economic, security and tourism collaboration between Japan and South Korea, and of the latter: collaboration in the context of natural disasters, e.g., between Turkey and Greece after the two 1999 earthquakes that damaged them; b) **Direct vs. indirect cooperation** - **Direct cooperation** relates to cooperation that involves physical contact between people from both parties (such as tourists from one country visiting the other – e.g., in the China-Japan case, or workers from one country finding employment in the other country – e.g., Polish workers in Germany in the post-World War II era). In contrast, **indirect cooperation** involves non-physical contact between the parties, manifested via the Internet and various cultural means, such as films, music, and literature. These activities still allow people to become acquainted with various aspects of the other party. An example is the 'Korean Wave' – the growing popularity since 1997 of South Korean, films, TV dramas and music in Japan.

²⁹ Deutsch, M. (2000). Cooperation and competition. In M. Deutsch and P. Coleman, eds., *The handbook of conflict resolution: Theory and practice* (pp. 21-40). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; Pettigrew, T. and Linda T. (2005). Allport's intergroup contact hypothesis: Its history and influence. In J. Dovidio, P. Glick and L. Rudman, eds., *On the nature of prejudice* (pp. 262-277). Malden, MA: Blackwell.

³⁰ Nets-Zehngut, 2009.

This process is termed 'passive' since healing of relations is achieved, or progresses, passively, without the former rivals actively seeking to heal their relations. In other words, reconciliation is **not** the aim of the collaboration but its by-product.³¹

2.3. Self-Healing Process (SHP)

In this process (discussed above in part 4 of the current book), as described in the literature,³² a party heals the damage it suffered during the conflict **without collaborating with its rival**. The word "self" refers to the object of the process, the wounded party, as well as stipulating that the healing takes place with no cooperation from the opponent.

The literature addresses **individual** self-healing intensively, claiming that people can alone heal their physical or psychological damages. This healing, however, can also be accomplished on the **collective** level. With a focus on **collective** self-healing in the context of conflicts, healing can be achieved, for instance, by establishing a chain of psychological clinics or support groups for victimized members, by practicing commemoration, by renewing damaged infrastructure or by establishing democratic institutions. In this way, each rival party is healing its own wounds, thereby increasing the chances for sustainable peace, since, for example, healing psychological wounds (anger or hate toward the rival) decreases the chances for the re-eruption of a conflict. Similarly, extremism and terrorism flourishes more in communities that suffer from dire economic and social conditions, and thus ameliorating the economic situation also decreases these chances.³³

An example of such a process is the one that Israeli-Palestinians have undergone since the end of the 1948 War, and especially beginning in the 1970s. This was partially an outcome of an important realization among many Israeli-Palestinians, as one of them expressed it vividly later: "We [Israeli-Palestinians] have no choice but to do it on our own [improve our situation]. Today many [Israeli-Palestinians] understand that it is not only the [Israeli] authorities that are

³¹ Nets-Zehngut, 2008, 2009.

³² Nets-Zehngut, R. (2012). The collective self-healing process in intractable conflicts – The Israeli-Palestinians' case. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 30 (2), 243-267; Nets-Zehngut, R., and Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict and possible pathways to peace. In J. Kuriansky (Ed.), *Psychotherapy in a turmoil region: Reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis from a psychological perspective* (pp. 3-13). Westport, CT: Praeger.

³³ Staub, 2011.


responsible [for our dire situation], but also we ourselves". Thus, since the 1970s, **socially**, the Israeli-Palestinians have published many more books addressing their situation, significantly increased their level of education (between 1961 and 2001, 5.5 times more high school pupils and 14 times more higher education students), and established significantly more NGOs (from c. 50 NGOs in the late 1970s to over 2000 in 2005, in all areas of life). Similarly, **economically**, they have drastically left agricultural professions, moving to blue collar and later to white collar occupations, as well as opening many factories (a few in the 1950s, 410 in 1983 and approximately 900 in 1992) – thereby significantly raising their standard of living. Likewise, **politically**, since the 1970s, they have been operating actively in the national and municipal domains, establishing their own parties and thereby increasingly influencing and controlling their own lives. and lastly, **psychologically**, as time has passed they have published many more memoirs that address the conflict and mostly since the 1990s they have started conducting pilgrimages to the sites of their ruined villages as well as off-site commemoration ceremonies.³⁴

2.4. In sum

Diagram 1 below summarizes the main aspects of the above discussion. As we can see in that diagram, conflicts (ellipse A) cause damage in the four domains of each party (B) - social, economic, political and psychological. Addressing this damage by implementing the three reconciliation and healing processes (1-3) increases the chances to reach the ultimate goal: sustainable peace (C) (as well as ameliorating the wounded parties' situation - D).

³⁴ Nets-Zehngut, 2012.

Diagram 1 - The Damage of Conflicts and the Three Processes to Address it



3. The lack in the literature

Although, as we have seen, all three processes have been discussed in the literature, they have never been integrated into one model. This is problematic, because they deal with a central and destructive phenomenon (intractable conflicts), the three processes are important in promoting sustainable peace and improving the parties' situation, they have been practiced worldwide and they are highly interconnected. The current article addresses this multi-faceted shortcoming by offering a first inclusive model of addressing conflict damage, a model that integrates the three processes; this is the article's contribution. Such discussion may contribute to the immense efforts made worldwide to address the destructive aftermath of conflicts, making these efforts more efficient and effective in promoting the ultimate goal: sustainable peace.

4. The suggested inclusive integrated model

This article suggests that rival parties typically are involved, or should be involved, in these three processes in order to promote sustainable peace. Due to the limited scope of this article, let us briefly address only some of the main aspects of the model.

A. Two (or more) rival parties – The model discussed here addresses the more common situations in which two parties (A and B) are involved in a conflict. It is, however, also applicable to the rarer conflicts in which more than two parties are involved.

B. Third party involvement - Although the three processes are described as involving only the rival parties, it is not uncommon for each of these processes (more often, the ARP and SHP) to also involve – even partially – third parties from the international community. These third parties might be countries or international organizations (e.g., the United Nations), all of which can provide financial, material, consultation or mediation aid to the parties, thereby increasing the chances that these processes will be initiated or will succeed. Such an example is the international support offered to Rwanda following the genocide that took place there in the mid-1990s.³⁵

C. Mutual positive impacts of the three processes – In this article a “**positive impact**” of each of the three processes is considered an impact that promotes **sustainable peace**. Practicing each of the three processes promotes sustainable peace and increases the chances that the other two processes will be practiced – thereby promoting sustainable peace.

Specifically, implementing the SHP not only improves the party's own situation, it also increases the chances that it will participate in an APR and/or a PRP with its rival. It probably at least partly healed due to the practice of the SHP (e.g., it holds fewer negative emotions toward its rival or its economic situation has improved). For instance, following World War II, Japan established a wide-ranging SHP, enabling it to later institute a broad PRP with Korea.³⁶ Similarly, implementing the PRP increases the chances for implementation of an ARP, since the rival parties have already collaborated for instrumental reasons, thereby

³⁵ Staub, 2011.


³⁶ Nets-Zehngut, 2012.

building some level of trust, decreased negative emotions and stereotypes via their direct connection. An example is the development of Polish-German relations, mentioned above. The masses of Polish workers working in West Germany in the post-World War II era (i.e., PRP motivated by the economic interests of the parties) was the crucial factor in the improvement of Poles' negative attitudes toward Germans. This, in turn, enabled the establishment of an active reconciliation process which included the 1965 Polish bishop's letter stating that Polish bishops "forgive and ask for forgiveness" from their German colleagues; and the 1972 Polish-German Commission of Historians which reached a more common narrative of the conflict and accordingly revised the history textbooks of both countries (Georg Eckert Institute, 2004). Since then these two processes have operated simultaneously.³⁷

And the circle of positive impacts continues – implementing the ARP promotes the development of a PRP (since the negative aftermath of the conflicts has been addressed, even if only partly).

D. An **"inclusive" model** – The model is termed "inclusive" because it includes **all** parties involved in addressing the aftermath of conflicts (the rival parties and third parties) as well as **all** of the parties' relevant activities (which are related to the conflict or not related to it). Diagram 2 below portrays the model: the two rival parties (A and B) can separately conduct a SHP and/or collaborate via an ARP or PRP; while third parties can be involved in each of these three processes.

Diagram 2 – The Model




³⁷ Jedlicki, J. (1999). Historical memory as a source of conflicts in Eastern Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 32, 225-232.

E. An "integrated" model – The model is termed "integrated" for two reasons: 1) The model includes the aforementioned three processes that are interconnected, each influencing the other (see above point C "Positive mutual impacts ..."); 2) The separate analysis of each of the three processes does not mean that they always exist in such a differentiated manner. Reality is complex and nuanced and thus at times, the lines between each of the three processes might be more blurred, and then some components of one process might be included in another process. For instance, at times, former rival parties might collaborate with the intention of both promoting reconciliation (ARP) and supporting their present interests that are not related to the conflict (PRP). An example is the 1993 Kono apology of Japan to Korea for atrocities committed by Japan in the 1939-1945 war between the countries. The apology was motivated by both moral/reconciliation considerations as well as pragmatic considerations (promoting trade and tourism between the two countries as well as the common security threat from China).³⁸ Nonetheless, the above analysis encompasses the typical main characteristics of each of these processes that are fundamentally different, and in any case, in reality, these processes often do exist in a differentiated manner.

F. The difficulties in initiating the three processes – What in the characteristics of these processes themselves increases or decreases the chances that they will be initiated/implemented? To understand this, we can imagine a spectrum of difficulties in initiating them on which the three processes are located (see below Diagram 3).

Diagram 3 – The Spectrum of Difficulties in the Initiation of the Three Processes



³⁸ Kang, E. and Yoshinori K. (2002). Confidence and security building between South Korea and Japan. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 28, 93- 108.

As we can see in diagram 3, the SHP at point A will usually encounter fewer difficulties in being initiated, and therefore it is the most feasible to practice. More to the right, the PRP will encounter greater difficulties (i.e., the second most feasible) while the APR will encounter the greatest difficulties (i.e., the least feasible).

Specifically, from left to right on the spectrum: implementing the SHP usually encounters fewer difficulties since this process **can be done independently of the rival party**. Each rival party does **not** need to collaborate with its opponent, does not need to cross barriers that must be crossed when implementing the PRP/ARP (see below). The vast SHP that the Israeli-Palestinians have practiced since 1948, and mainly since the late 1970s, exemplifies implementation of this process with no APR at hand with Israel (officially, actually not even at present).³⁹

Moving to the PRP or the ARP, accepting the approval of the rival party for collaboration in these processes might be difficult and at times even impossible. Specifically, accepting the approval of the rival party for collaboration in the PRP might be hard since two preliminary main barriers must be overcome: a) Each party has to overcome certain psychological obstacles, for instance, based on the negative emotions, stereotypes, and lack of trust toward its opponent caused by the conflict. To overcome this barrier without the implementation of an ARP is hard to do; and b) The interests of each rival party have to coincide so that the instrumental collaboration – the essence of the PRP – will benefit both parties. If **both** of these barriers are not overcome, the PRP will not be initiated. However, implementing the PRP is easier than implementing the ARP (discussed in the following paragraph) since, although the parties must collaborate with their rivals to initiate PRP, they still do not have to acknowledge their own illegal activities during the conflict (one of the components of ARP). Moreover, the same level of negative emotions and stereotypes that prevents APR might not prevent PRP. The reason is that economic collaboration, for example, is colder and more instrumental and thus requires fewer close relations than when intimately dealing with the history and damage of the conflict that are inherent in the ARP.

Moving to practicing the APR, here there is only one main barrier to overcome, but a very high one: Each of the opponents, and primarily the stronger one/perpetrator, must acknowledge its own illegal activities conducted during the conflict and/or be willing to ask for forgiveness and/or pay reparations; while the

³⁹ Nets-Zehngut, 2008.

weaker/victimized party has to forgive the perpetrator party. In other words, although the ARP involves just one preliminary barrier, it is typically much higher and more difficult to overcome than the two barriers involving the PRP, thereby placing the ARP at the right pole of the spectrum.

The above discussion about the PRP and ARP can be exemplified by Chinese-Japanese relations in the context of their 1937-1945 war. The two countries largely have not conducted an APR until now, mainly because Japan has refused to acknowledge its illegal activities conducted during the war, such as the 1937 Nanking massacre of some 300,000 Chinese. However, the countries have decided to put aside dealing with the past via an ARP, in favor of promoting their more urgent present interests via a PRP (e.g., economic and tourism relations), which have already been flourishing for several decades.⁴⁰

G. The sequence of initiation of the three processes - The above discussion leads to the question of **the typical sequence of implementing the three processes**; this sequence is influenced by the extent of difficulties/feasibility. In other words, typically, if the SHP is initially practiced by each rival party, there are greater chances that the PRP will be implemented and lastly, if at all, and perhaps after a long period of time, the ARP.

Another factor that delays the implementation of the PRP and the ARP (compared to the SHP) is the "passage of time". The more time that passes from the resolution of a conflict, usually the more healing of psychological wounds will take place, enabling the parties to collaborate with their former rivals via a PRP or an ARP. Additionally, as time passes, a generational turnover takes place, whereby a younger generation becomes more involved in the public sphere of its society (e.g., as historians, journalists, publishers, and state officials). Younger generations are usually more critical and open to admit past wrongdoings of their people, increasing the chances that an ARP will be practiced with their opponents.⁴¹

H. Parallel practice of the three processes – Once a new process **starts/is initiated** (as discussed in above), it will usually be **practiced** in parallel to the preceding processes. This means that, following the practice of a SHP, when a PRP starts, both processes will usually be practiced simultaneously; there is still

⁴⁰ Er, L. P. (2002). The Apology issue: Japan's differing approaches toward China and South-Korea. *American Asian Review*, 20(3), 31-54.

⁴¹ Nets-Zehngut, R. (2012). The passing of time and the collective memory of conflicts. *Peace and Change*, 37 (2), 253-285.

need to practice the SHP and no obstacle in doing so. And once the ARP follows, it will join the preceding two processes (i.e., the three processes will be practiced simultaneously). Such parallel practice increases the chances for sustainable peace.

I. **The impact of the three processes on signing a peace agreement** – The three processes were described above as being practiced in their typical context, in the post-conflict phase, **after** a peace agreement has been signed, thereby promoting **sustainable peace**. However, it should be noted that at times these processes can also be practiced in the pre-resolution phase of the conflict, **before** a peace agreement is signed. In such cases, based on the above discussion about promotion of **sustainable peace**, these processes may increase the chances that a peace agreement will be signed (i.e., promote **peace**).

How can each of the three processes be implemented in the pre-resolution phase? Typically, each party will implement the SHP in this phase (since there are no obstacles in implementation and there is a need to do so). At times (when intractable conflicts experience calmer periods in which they are not so violent, if at all), they might be able and wish to implement the PRP in order to address their present mutual interests. This was the case, for instance, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Wide economic, health, environmental and tourism collaboration took place between Israel and the Palestinian Authority between 1994 and early 2000, when the peace process was active. This collaboration ameliorated the attitudes of the participants from each party towards the members of their opponents with whom they were collaborating,⁴² even though eventually peace was not reached, but for other reasons. Lastly, however, usually the APR will **not** be practiced in the pre-resolution phase, since the actual conflict has not been resolved and thus the psychological barriers between the parties are too high to overcome.

J. **Applicability of the model also to other types of collective violence** – The model has been described as applicable to intractable **conflicts**. However, in reality, there are also other forms of collective political violence such as dictatorships (e.g., the military regimes in Chile, Argentina and Peru in the second half of the twentieth century or the apartheid regime in South Africa); post-colonialism in many countries in Africa for example; genocide (e.g., of the Armenians in 1915 by the Ottoman Empire), and the Holocaust. In all of these instances, the three processes or some of them have also taken place, or should

⁴² Nets-Zehngut, 2008.

take place, thereby increasing the chances of the healing and the reconciliation of the parties. One example is the relations between Germany and Israel in the context of the Holocaust. Since the beginning of the 1950s, substantial ARP has taken place between West Germany and Israel. It has included, on the part of Germans, taking responsibility for the Holocaust, apologizing, paying reparations to individual survivors and to the state of Israel, and more. These activities have alleviated the negative emotions and perceptions of Israeli Jews toward Germany.⁴³

5. In Conclusion

The world experiences many conflicts that cause severe damage to the rival parties, damage that must be addressed in order to promote sustainable peace. This article proposes the first inclusive integrated model for addressing this damage, and implementing it increases the chances of reaching sustainable peace. It is suggested that future research address various aspects of the dynamics of this model in order to be able to deal more efficiently and effectively with the major destructive power of conflict.

⁴³ Nadler, A. 2001. The victim and the psychologist: Changing perceptions of Israeli Holocaust survivors by the mental health community in the past 50 years. *History of Psychology*, 4 (2), 159-181; Segev, T. (2000). *The seventh million: Israelis and the Holocaust*. New York: Henry Holt.