

The Israeli and Palestinian Collective Memories of Their Conflict: Determinants, Characteristics, and Implications

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(July 20th)...we meet, [Elyakim] Rubinstein, Oded Eran and [Dan] Meridor [Israelis] with Nabil Shaath and Yasser Abed Rabu [Palestinians]...[Israel] is required to accept responsibility for the creation of the [Palestinian] refugee problem...Shaath explained the Palestinian stand, and Elyakim, ours: we [Israelis] do not accept responsibility for the creation of the problem. (July 22nd)...another meeting takes place regarding the refugees that slides into a head-on clash between two narratives, a desperate clash. Shaath describes with excitement the history of the conflict in the eyes of the Palestinians:... the Jews conducted a deliberate policy of transferring the Palestinians away...in the 1948 War the Jews deliberately expelled hundreds of thousands of Palestinians...at the end of the meeting I [Dan Meridor] asked myself: can we reach some point of agreement [about these contradictory historical narratives]? Unfortunately, it seems to me that the subject is too deep and emotional...difficult. Very difficult.¹

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IN JULY 2000 THE ISRAELIS, headed by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and the Palestinians, headed by President Yasser Arafat, met at the U.S. military base of Camp David in an attempt to reach a peace agreement with the help of U.S. mediation headed by President Bill Clinton. The participants at the summit discussed various aspects of a potential agreement, including borders, Jerusalem, security arrangements, the Israeli settlements, and the Palestinian refugee prob-

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lem. This Palestinian refugee problem refers to the some 650,000 Palestinians who became refugees during the 1948 war and their descendants. Generally, the Palestinians demand the right of return of the refugees and their descendants into Israel and/or the payment of reparations while the Israelis reject both demands.² The quotation above addresses the historical narratives of the parties' negotiators regarding the causes of the 1948 exodus that created this problem. The contradictions in these narratives—as manifested in the quotation above—inhibited resolution of the refugee component of the negotiations. The Israelis claimed they bore no responsibility (the Palestinians left willingly in 1948) while the Palestinians claimed the Israelis did bear responsibility (the Palestinians were expelled by the Israelis/Jews). At the end, no peace agreement was reached at the Camp David summit and shortly thereafter the second Palestinian uprising, or *Intifada*, erupted, leading to additional bloodshed in the Middle East. The Palestinian uprising is a vivid example of the importance of historical narratives in international conflicts, and in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in particular.³ This is why both observers and participants have attributed such significance to collective memory in recent decades: historical narratives such as these run deep in academic, social, and political spheres.⁴

A narrative is generally a story about a certain topic that has a plot with clear starting and ending points, providing sequential and causal coherence.⁵ While the topic at hand is the history of an intractable conflict, its varying narratives endeavor to take on the format of such a plot, addressing the major events that led to the eruption of the conflict and that occurred during it.⁶ When a group such as an ethnic group or a state adopts a narrative to be the true representation of the past, it becomes part of the group's collective memory.⁷

Collective memory is generally defined as representations of the past, which have been assembled into narratives that are collectively adopted. Collective memory is a category that includes five types of submemories.⁸ First is popular memory, defined as representations of the past held by the society's members and best manifested in responses to public opinion surveys. This type of memory significantly influences the psychological reactions of people—such as their emotions, trust, and stereotypes in relation to others—and consequently, their behavior adopt.⁹ Second is official memory, the representations of the past the formal institutions of the group. This memory is manifested, for instance, in army publications, national museum exhibitions, and textbooks approved for use in the educational system.¹⁰ Third is autobiographical memory, which is that of the people who directly experienced the events, typically demonstrated through their memoirs and oral histories. This type of memory is accorded considerable



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importance as a primary source of knowledge about the past.¹¹ Fourth is historical memory, the way the research community—academic and independent scholars—views the past in its studies.¹² Fifth is cultural memory, the way the society represents its past through newspaper articles, memorials, monuments, films, and buildings, among other items or products.¹³ The significance of the latter four types of memory is mostly that they influence popular memory.¹⁴ In addition, official memory has its own separate importance: it represents nations in the international arena and thereby influences their foreign relations.¹⁵

I focus here on the collective memory of intractable conflicts. Such a memory typically adopts significantly biased and distorted narratives, characterized by a simplistic black-and-white view in favor of the in-group. This view generally contends that “they,” the rivals, acted negatively throughout the conflict (e.g., initiated the conflict), while “we” acted positively (e.g., always tried to reach peace). Such a memory is, on the one hand, typically functional during the conflict’s climax, providing each party with the sociopsychological basis needed to meet the enormous challenges that an intractable conflict demands. On the other hand, such a memory will inhibit peaceful resolution of the conflict and the process of reconciliation between the parties involved. The more significantly a party’s memory can be transformed into one that is less biased—provided that there is a factual basis for such a transformation—the more the party’s psychological reactions will accommodate the rival. Thus, the party will become more inclined to view the rival in a humanized manner, which increases the likelihood of achieving peace and reconciliation.¹⁶

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With this theoretical background, the article deals with a specific case study: the Israeli/Jewish (“Israeli”) and Palestinian collective memories of their conflict, focusing on the 1948 Palestinian exodus.¹⁷ As will be shown, both memories have somewhat transformed over the years to become less biased and self-serving.

THE CONFLICT AND THE EXODUS

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is largely an intractable conflict and part of the wider Israeli–Arab conflict. Its roots come from the late nineteenth century, when Jewish Zionist pioneers arrived to *Eretz Israel* (Hebrew for “the Land of Israel”) and settled the land under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Initially,



the pioneers did not encounter massive negative reactions from the local Palestinians. Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, as the number of pioneers increased, so did Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinians began to act widely against the pioneers, including through violent acts.¹⁸ Consequently, as time passed, violence between the parties escalated while they were under British rule. The Palestinians objected to the 1948 United Nations resolution that established a Jewish state and initiated the 1948 war, backed by several Arab countries. Israel won the war, resulting in the displacement of some 650,000 Palestinians in what is known as the 1948 exodus. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) estimates the current number of refugees and their descendants to be about 5.1 million.¹⁹ Over the years, Israel and Arab countries fought several additional wars: in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and 2006. The 1967 Six Day War led to Israel's seizure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and their continued occupation. In 1987 and 2000, Palestinian uprisings, or Intifadas, erupted, conducted by residents of these territories.²⁰ The various parties to the conflict negotiated numerous peace initiatives, leading to two peace agreements (in 1979 with Egypt and in 1994 with Jordan) as well as interim agreements in the mid-1990s with the Palestinians. These latter agreements led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. In 2005, Israel transferred the Gaza Strip to the full control of the Palestinians.²¹

The central historical event in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—and in the parties' memories of the conflict—has been the exodus, which led to the Palestinian refugee problem. Since 1948, this problem has become a major element in Israeli–Arab/Palestinian relations, as the Arabs/Palestinians conducted a widespread diplomatic campaign demanding the return of the refugees to Israel.²² Since the Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations in the 1990s, the problem has become a major issue in need of resolution. Most Israelis—91 percent in 2010—object to the return of the refugees to Israel and see it as a major threat to their security.²³ As for the Palestinians, they consider the exodus and the 1948 events in general to be their *Nakba* (meaning “catastrophe” in Arabic) and a cornerstone of their identity.

The Israelis and the Palestinians hold varying narratives regarding the causes of the 1948 exodus. The main narratives are situated on a spectrum: at the right pole, the Zionist narrative of willing flight; in the middle, the critical narrative of willing flight and expulsions; and at the left pole, the Palestinian narrative of expulsion.²⁴

THE ISRAELI COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF THE EXODUS



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Two narratives about the exodus have been prevalent among Israelis since 1948: Zionist and critical.²⁵ The Zionist narrative takes no responsibility for the exodus and holds the Arabs/Palestinians solely accountable. The Palestinians, it argues, left willingly because of their fear and blanket appeals from the Palestinian leadership and the Arab states to leave. Acts of expulsion by Israeli forces are not noted and are actually denied.²⁶ In contrast, according to the critical narrative, some Palestinians left willingly—partially in response to calls from their leadership to leave or as a result of fear and societal collapse—while others were expelled by the Jewish/Israeli fighting forces. The critical narrative's take on the Palestinian expulsion and its cause sharply contrasts with the Zionist narrative of no expulsion.²⁷

State and societal activity strengthened the grip of the hegemonic, Zionist narrative in Israel.

Until the late 1970s, the Zionist narrative of the exodus, and actually of the conflict as a whole, was widely disseminated among Israelis.²⁸ This was accomplished through the distribution of booklets by the National Information Center and through history and civics textbooks that were Ministry of Education approved (or were used in the educational system, not necessarily with the ministry's approval), among other methods.²⁹ The Zionist narrative was also spread via publications by the Education Corps of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which distributed copies among its soldiers, and through the *Amud Haesh* (Hebrew for "Pillar of Fire") television series, broadcast in Israel in 1981, that covered the main events of Zionism from 1896 to 1948.³⁰ This dissemination project was conducted not only by the state institutions described above, but also through societal means such as studies by Israeli scholars, memoirs of the 1948 war written by its Jewish veterans, and essays in the daily newspapers.³¹ Together state and societal activity strengthened the grip of the hegemonic, Zionist narrative in Israel.

Beginning in the 1970s, Israeli societal institutions started significantly challenging the hegemony of the Zionist narrative of the conflict as a whole. The scholar Yeoshua Porat, for example, published a book in which he argues that the 1936–1939 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the British and not against the Jews, contrary to what the inclusive Zionist narrative of the conflict claimed.³² As for the exodus, many scholarly studies and daily newspaper essays as well as some 1948 Jewish war veterans' memoirs began presenting the critical narrative of that event.³³

This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the commencement of a historical revisionist period commonly known as the New Historians era.



New historical studies criticized additional aspects of the Zionist narrative of the conflict or supported criticism raised earlier, such as the critical narrative of the 1948 exodus. For example, these studies suggested that the Jews divided the territory in an agreement in 1948 with King Abdullah of Jordan, and that the military balance between the Jews and the Arabs/Palestinians in some phases of the 1948 war favored the Jews.³⁴ Regarding the exodus, historian Benny Morris reinforced the critical narrative with many documents he traced in archives, such as orders from IDF headquarters in 1948 to expel the Palestinian residents of the main cities of Lydda and Ramla and those from localities in the northern front.³⁵ Subsequent historical studies also provided such support, although narrower in scope.³⁶ Thus, since the late 1980s, the critical narrative has for the most part been the exclusively accepted narrative in Israeli studies.³⁷ Moreover, since the late 1980s, the publication of critical-narrative newspaper essays also increased, forming the vast majority of newspaper essays, as did critical narrative memoirs by veterans of the 1948 war, constituting about one-third of the memoirs.³⁸ At the same time, Israeli NGOs began to present the critical and the Palestinian narratives more significantly in their publications.³⁹ Later, beginning in the 1990s, some textbooks—used without approval in the educational system—began to present the critical narrative.⁴⁰ The documents provided by the abovementioned scholarly studies and others, in addition to the testimonies given by Jewish 1948 war veterans, presented a solid basis for concluding that the critical narrative of the exodus is more accurate than the Zionist one.⁴¹

The approaches to the exodus varied among Israeli state institutions. The IDF and the National Information Center continued to present the Zionist narrative until at least 2004. The Israeli national television station, however, took a different stance by relaying the critical narrative through the TV series *Tekuma* (Hebrew for “Resurrection”) from December 1997 to May 1998. This well-respected series, which covered the major events in Israel’s history, was produced in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defense for the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the State of Israel. While describing the 1948 war, the program surprisingly stated that some Palestinians were expelled.⁴² The Ministry of Education’s approach was similar. Until 1999 the ministry’s approved history and civics textbooks had largely presented the Zionist narrative. From 2000 until at least 2004, however, they presented the critical narrative exclusively.⁴³ Similarly, in 2005 the Israeli National Archive published a book containing a selection of documents pertaining to the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The book cited Morris’ version of the expulsion of Palestinians from the central Palestinian cities of Lydda and Ramla in 1948.⁴⁴



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It also revealed a telegram sent by Rabin, ordering local Israeli commanders to expel the residents of these two cities.⁴⁵

As for the Israeli popular memory of the exodus, the first study that focused on the Israeli memory of the conflict through a representative sample in a public opinion survey was conducted in 2008. It found that only 41 percent of Israelis ascribed to the Zionist narrative while 39 percent favored the critical narrative and 8 percent favored the Palestinian narrative (12 percent did not reply). That is 47 percent of the Israelis believed that some or all of the Palestinians were expelled in 1948—more than those who believed in the no-expulsion Zionist narrative.⁴⁶ This sampling of Israeli public opinion likely represented a considerable shift in the Israeli popular memory of the exodus, which had appeared to be much more Zionist-oriented in the first decades after 1948.⁴⁷

In summary, various types of submemories fall under the umbrella category of collective memory: official (National Information Center, the IDF, the Ministry of Education, national television, and the National Archive); historical (research community); autobiographical (war veterans); cultural (newspapers and NGOs); and popular (society at large). The first four components of the Israeli collective memory of the exodus began to transform gradually but significantly in the 1970s from what was initially an exclusively Zionist memory into a significantly critical one. This process took place initially among the societal institutions of Israel and, since the late 1990s, among some of the state institutions as well.

THE PALESTINIAN COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF THE EXODUS

The collective Palestinian memory of the exodus has not been systematically researched over a long period of time in a representative manner. Therefore, it is impossible to present that memory after 1948 in the same way that the Israeli memory was presented above. However, recent studies provide a contemporary picture of the Palestinian memory. All three types of narratives—Palestinian, critical, and Zionist—were found in these studies.

As for the Palestinian official memory, six studies examined this memory as it is manifested in Palestinian textbooks, approved since 2000 by the Palestinian Authority. All of these studies found that the textbooks portrayed expulsion as the sole cause of the exodus. That is the textbooks presented the Palestinian narrative only.⁴⁸ The Palestinian historical memory has not been examined by systematic studies even in recent years. However, Israeli scholars have typically viewed the studies of their Palestinian colleagues as adhering to the Palestinian



narrative.⁴⁹ This is also a view held by at least some Palestinian scholars.⁵⁰ Indeed, there are some examples of earlier Palestinian studies that clearly presented the Palestinian narrative.⁵¹ Nonetheless, an unsystematic examination of some studies published more recently by Palestinians reveals that some support the critical narrative rather than the Palestinian one.⁵²

Next, autobiographical memory, that of the Palestinian refugees who directly experienced the 1948 exodus. A study by the author of this article examined the memory of refugees regarding the exodus from 38 localities as manifested in four oral history projects.⁵³ The results of these projects were published in 1978, 1988, 2003, and 2005. The study found that the expulsion cause was cited only in relation to about a third of the localities. Other causes given were fear, attacks on the localities by the Jewish/Israeli fighting forces, and occasional psychological warfare by these forces as well as orders from Arab commanders to leave. Altogether these oral history projects presented the critical narrative the most.⁵⁴ Another study conducted in the late 1990s examined the autobiographical memory of 136 Palestinian refugees from many localities and found that the expulsion cause was not mentioned at all; rather, fear was cited the most, and Arab orders (part of the Zionist narrative) were rarely cited as a cause.⁵⁵

110 With regard to popular memory of Palestinians living in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, a 1999 Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research representative public opinion survey examined in passing the memory of Palestinians residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It found that 59 percent of respondents had adopted the Palestinian narrative, 18 percent held the critical narrative (expulsion, Arab orders, and willing flight), and 10 percent held the Zionist narrative (willing flight and Arabs orders); the remaining 13 percent did not respond.⁵⁶ Later, a 2003 Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research representative public opinion survey examined the memory of the Palestinians residing in Israel. It found that 71 percent of respondents held the Palestinian narrative, eight percent held the critical narrative (expulsion and Arab orders), and 15 percent held Zionist narrative (willing flight and Arabs orders), the remaining six percent did not respond.⁵⁷ That is both groups of Palestinians surveyed were inclined to support the Palestinian narrative, though not exclusively—in Israel it was more prevalent.⁵⁸

To summarize, the recent Palestinian official memory as manifested in textbooks promotes the Palestinian narrative exclusively, and the recent popular memory favors that narrative. The historical memory might have been exclusively Palestinian in the past, but in the last decade or so has probably become at least partly critical. Another manifestation of this increasingly open tendency among



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Palestinian scholars is their widespread participation in narrative collaboration projects with Israeli scholars discussed in greater depth later in this article. As for the autobiographical memory, the findings are diverse: according to one study, it has been critical since at least the mid-1970s; and according to another, it has been Zionist since at least the mid-1990s.⁵⁹

COLLABORATION BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS ON HISTORICAL NARRATIVES

Since the early 2000s, an important phenomenon has been occurring with regard to the historical narratives of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: the two sides have been collaborating in an effort to extensively address these narratives.⁶⁰ Nine such projects have taken place: PRIME, Shared Histories, Circles of Knowledge, Zochrot, History’s Double Helix, Shared Narratives, Van Leer, IHJR, and Gabay-Kazak.⁶¹ Among these projects, PRIME stands out for its domestic and international recognition, having received about 10 Israeli and international peace awards. Booklets containing PRIME’s results were translated into eight languages; the project received extensive local and international media coverage; it is partially used in both the Israeli and Palestinian educational systems; and its concept was adopted for use in other conflicts. Examples of other conflicts are those in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Qatar, Malaysia, and Germany, as well as between Russia and Georgia and between Japan and both Korea and China.⁶²

The collaborative projects were conducted by only some members of societal institutions—mostly scholars as well as teachers, peace activists, and people with direct experience in the conflict, such as Palestinian refugees. Their activities entailed becoming acquainted with the narratives of the other party; reducing the differences between the parties’ narratives; agreeing on two parallel but legitimate narratives; discussing the possibilities of properly addressing their historical narratives; and acknowledging that each party might have several narratives on the same topic rather than just one.

The projects addressed various issues in the conflict, including the parties’ rights to the disputed territory; relations between the Palestinians and the pioneering Jews in the first half of the twentieth century in Palestine/Eretz Israel; the Palestinian national movement (1919–1939); the UN resolution of 1947 to establish Jewish and Palestinian states; the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, including the exodus; the 1967 Six Day War; the Israeli settlements; religious and victimhood aspects of the conflict; and the reasons for the failure of the 2000 Camp David peace summit. The projects typically resulted in the publication of booklets



or books in Hebrew, Arabic, and/or English, which were disseminated to the general public and academia—as well as within the educational systems, where they were used to some extent.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

I found that the Israeli and Palestinian collective memories of the exodus were heterogeneous and changing over time. The Israeli collective memory was initially almost exclusively Zionist, and since the 1970s significantly

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critical—at first only among societal institutions. The Palestinian collective memory largely ascribes to the Palestinian narrative with the apparent exception of a partial change to a critical narrative interpretation in their historical

memory in the last decade or so. The Palestinian autobiographical memory, meanwhile, has been mainly critical and partially Zionist since at least the 1970s.

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It is hard to rigorously compare the collective memories of both parties since there is much more information about the Israeli memory. Nonetheless careful assertions can be made. It seems that both official memories are more inclined to self-serving narratives, especially when compared to societal memories. The Israeli official memory leans toward the Zionist narrative exclusively until the 1990s, and the Palestinian memory toward the Palestinian narrative. Nonetheless, comparing only the contemporary representations of the official memory in textbooks, it is clear that the Israeli memory is exclusively critical while the Palestinian memory is exclusively Palestinian. The two historical memories, however, seem somewhat similar. Both seem to be transformed into less self-serving ones, becoming critical narrative-based memories. Among Israeli scholars, this process began in the late 1970s and since the late 1980s they have largely presented only the critical narrative. Among their Palestinian colleagues, this process most likely began more recently and its scope is unknown. Likewise the autobiographical memories of both parties seem to have been somewhat critical since the 1970s. In contrast, the popular memories of the parties differ since a self-serving narrative has a stronger grip among the Palestinians. Many Palestinians support the Palestinian narrative—59 percent in 1999 and 71 percent in 2003—compared to only 41 percent of Israelis holding the critical narrative



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in 2008.⁶³ If we compare only the two post-2000 surveys (in order to examine surveys from the same period), the difference is especially large. Based on the 2003 survey, 71 percent of the Palestinians hold their self-serving Palestinian narrative versus only 41 percent of the Israelis who hold their self-serving Zionist narrative (based on the 2008 survey). In summary, there are some similarities, but the Israeli memory is less inclined toward a self-serving narrative (Zionist) compared to the inclination of the Palestinians toward a self-serving narrative (Palestinian). This is especially true regarding the parties' official and popular memories.

How can we explain this state of affairs? To address this broad topic briefly, two major factors largely shaped the presentation of the exodus within both parties. The first was an outbound factor: the wishes of the parties to support their positions in the international arena and in their negotiations with the rival. Each party wanted to place the responsibility for the exodus on the other in order to gain international support for its position—the return of the refugees or their nonreturn, receiving reparations or not—a position that was later presented as well in the peace negotiations. The second was an inbound factor: each party's wish to mobilize its members so that they would be patriotic, highly attached to their group, and motivated against the rival. In times of diplomatic and military confrontations, these outbound and inbound aims are especially important to the formal institutions that represent the parties. This factor led the parties to adopt what they perceived to be self-serving narratives after 1948: the Zionist narrative for the Israelis and the Palestinian one for the Palestinians. This process was somewhat biased in favor of the parties because the Israeli memory ignored the 1948 partial expulsions and the Palestinian memory ignored the 1948 partial willing flight.⁶⁴

As time has passed, the entire context of Israeli lives has changed.⁶⁵ Since the 1970s they have become more reassured by Israel's military and economic might; pluralism and critical tendencies have increased in part due to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Lebanon War, and the 1987 Intifada; while collectivism and conformism have decreased, in part due to Americanization and later to globalization.⁶⁶ Israel has also bore witness to a generational turnover, in which the 1948 generation—the more conservative and Zionist-oriented one—has gradually given more control to the younger, more openminded generation. Additionally, in 1977 a dramatic political turnover took place: the Likud Party replaced the Ma'arach Party after three decades. This led to a rift between the state institutions and the social elite, and the latter felt freer to support the critical narrative. Additionally, in the mid-1970s the main newspapers



moved toward private ownership and became more commercially oriented—by the mid-1990s, they were all privately owned. In addition, the electronic media experienced extensive deregulation in the mid-1990s, which led to the opening of dozens of new radio and television channels.⁶⁷ These shifts led to a wider dissemination of critical narratives, ideas, and information in the media. Finally, the research community has been influenced by critical narrative theories (such as postmodernism and multiculturalism, developed in Western academia), and in the early 1980s Israeli archival documents regarding the 1948 war began to be declassified. The declassification allowed for the publication of studies based on documents that described expulsions. All these changes created a context that favored much more openness to the critical narrative.

The societal/nonformal institutions were the first to start adopting the critical narrative as of the 1970s. As nonrepresentative institutions, they were believed to be less capable of causing harm to Israel than could formal institutions. Societal institutions also tended to be less exposed to sanctions for deviating from the Zionist narrative. Only two decades later in the 1990s did some state institutions take on this critical tendency.⁶⁸ This early and widespread adoption of the critical narrative, as well as the political, social, and economic changes in Israeli society, explain why the 1948 expulsions were well embedded in the Israeli popular memory of the exodus by 2008.

The Palestinians will be addressed in a more limited manner. I will focus on their official memory from the contemporary period since the Palestinian Authority was not established until 1994, and the Palestinians did not begin publishing their own textbooks until 2000.⁶⁹ The inbound factor, citizens' mobilization, contributed to the adoption of the Palestinian narrative in their official memory.⁷⁰ The outbound factor, international support and peace negotiations, was manifested in the opening extract from the 2000 Camp David peace summit.⁷¹ Their historical memory was also influenced by these two factors, leading to what seems to be an initial stronghold of the Palestinian narrative of the exodus.⁷² However, mainly since the 1990s, a different voice began being heard among Palestinian scholars—one that calls for more self-reflective, open, and critical approaches to their history.⁷³ For example, in 1998, the late Edward Said, a renowned Palestinian scholar, wrote:

Speaking self-critically, I feel that as Arabs generally, and Palestinians in particular, we must also begin to explore our own histories, myths, and patriarchal ideas of the nation, something which, for obvious reasons, we have not so far done...as intellectuals and historians we have a duty to look at our history, the history of our leaderships, and of our institutions with a new critical eye...[T]hese are serious, and even

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crucial matters, and they cannot either be left unanswered or postponed indefinitely under the guise of national defense and national unity.⁷⁴


This more critical voice was an outcome of many factors, such as the 1990s peace process that caused the Palestinians to feel that they were approaching the establishment of their own state and that they therefore could deal more openly with the 1948 war. Another factor was the critical trend in Western academia and in Israel. This trend toward a more critical voice appeared, to some Palestinian scholars, to represent the mainstream inclination—not only in their professional community but also among the Israeli scholars. Moreover, as time passed, the Palestinians significantly recuperated from their 1948 trauma. For example, the Israeli–Palestinians’ self-healing process, especially since the late 1960s, fostered gradual healing in social, educational, economic, psychological, and political spheres.⁷⁵ All of these phenomena contributed to the adoption of the critical narrative of the exodus in some Palestinian studies.⁷⁶

What are the main implications of the previously described state of the parties’ collective memories? As the above literature review suggests, holding biased, self-serving narratives inhibits peace. Therefore, on the psychological level, the more that this phenomenon is prevalent in a society, the stronger its psychological inhibition will be in its progress towards peace. For example, the 2008 survey described above, which was conducted among the Israelis, found that those who held an inclusive critical narrative of the conflict (of 23 major events) are more inclined to choose dovish parties in the Knesset parliament elections. They are also less inclined to have negative feelings towards Palestinians (hatred, fear, rage, and delegitimization) and are more supportive of signing peace agreements with them in contrast with people holding an inclusive Zionist narrative of the conflict.⁷⁷ The Palestinian popular memory—regarding the 1948 exodus—was found to be characterized more by a self-serving narrative than was the case with the Israeli popular memory. The Palestinian narrative of the exodus is self-serving for the Palestinians since it attributes no responsibility to them for the exodus, while the Zionist narrative is self-serving for the Israelis since it attributes no responsibility to them. Therefore, the Palestinian inhibition relating to resolving the conflict peacefully—in terms of popular memory of the exodus—is stronger. That said, the Israeli popular memory of the exodus is also characterized to a significant degree by a self-serving biased Zionist narrative (41 percent), which considerably inhibits peace. Although this analysis addresses only one event in the conflict, the exodus, this is the major event of the conflict. Thus the impact of this event’s memory is probably significant.

On the academic level, the relatively recent critical orientation of Palestin-

ian scholars regarding the exodus, as well as their widespread collaboration with Israeli scholars in historical narrative projects in general, increases the chances that these scholars will contribute to a transformation of the Palestinian popular and official memories into more critical ones.

Finally, on the diplomatic level, currently each party presents contradictory narratives in the peace negotiations that fully blame the other for the exodus (Palestinian and Zionist narratives). Such a situation inhibits resolution of their conflict, because the parties cannot agree about what happened in 1948 nor on the practical implications of this for their peace agreement (as far as it relates to its Palestinian refugee problem component). This also has a psychological implication because it is important for the Palestinians that the Israelis acknowledge publicly that expulsions did take place in 1948.

Transformation of the narratives that the parties adopt into less self-serving ones can promote resolution of the refugee component of the negotiations. The aforementioned societal narratives collaboration projects are one type of activity that can promote such transformation. Another possible activity in this direction, possibly a more important one, is the formation of an official historians committee of both parties. Such committees, whose members are selected by the governments of the parties, have been operating worldwide and many of them have been successful in bridging the gaps between the narratives of rivals or agreeing upon two parallel but legitimized narratives. This has promoted peace, healing, and reconciliation in many countries and regions.⁷⁸ The extent to which the parties will transform their collective memories to be less self-serving or decide to form an official historians committee is influenced by many future international occurrences, social and political Israeli and Palestinian local occurrences, and the state of affairs of conflict. These international, local, and conflict contexts are dynamic and thus it is hard to foresee their developments and the future of the parties' memories. 

NOTES

1. Diary of Dan Meridor, Chair of the Israeli Parliament Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security and a member of the Israeli delegation to the summit, 2000.

2. "Israeli/Israelis" is referred here to the State of Israel or the Jews living in that state, and includes their various institutions such as the academy and the media.

3. Ian Lustick, "Negotiating Truth: the Holocaust, *Lehavdil*, and *Al-Nakba*," *Journal of International Affairs* 60 (2006): 52–77; Robert Rotberg, *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict—History's Double Helix* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).

4. Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, "Introduction," in *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3–61; Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwartz, "Introduction: Mapping Memory," in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwartz (New York: Fordham University

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Press, 2010), 1–13.

5. Jerome Bruner, *Acts of Meaning* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

6. Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Major Events and the Collective Memory of Conflicts,” *International Journal of Conflict Management* 24, no. 3 (2013): 209–30. These conflicts are characterized as being, inter alia, long and violent, and to address issues of major importance to the parties involved. See: Daniel Bar-Tal, *Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

7. James Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

8. Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “The Passing of Time and the Collective Memory of Conflicts: The Case of Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus,” *Peace and Change* 37 (2012): 253–85.

9. David Middleton and Derek Edwards, *Collective Remembering* (London: Sage Publications, 1997).

10. Jeffrey Olick, “What does it Mean to Normalize the Past: Official Memory in German Politics since 1989,” *Social Science History* 22 (1998): 547–71.

11. Kent Jennings and Ning Zhang, “Generations, Political Status, and Collective Memories in the Chinese Countryside,” *Journal of Politics* 67 (2005): 1164–89.

12. Jay Winter and Emanuel Sivan, “Setting the Framework,” in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter and Emanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6–39.

13. Jan Assmann, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” *New German Critique* 65 (1995): 125–33.

14. James Liu and Denise Hilton, “How the Past Weighs on the Present: Social Representations of History and their Role in Identity Politics,” *British Journal of Social Psychology* 44 (2005): 537–56.

15. Eric Langenbacher, “Collective Memory as a Factor in Political Culture and International Relations,” in *Power and the Past—Collective Memory and International Relations*, ed. Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010): 13–49.

16. Patrick Devine-Wright, “A Theoretical Overview of Memory and Conflict,” in *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Ed Cairns and Michael Roe (New York: Palgrave, 2003): 9–33; Dario Paez and James Liu, “Collective Memory of Conflicts,” in *Intergroup Conflicts and their Resolution—A Social Psychological Perspective*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal (New York: Psychology Press, 2011): 105–24; Barbara Tint, “History, Memory, and Intractable Conflict,” *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 27 (2010): 239–56.

17. Palestinians are those living anywhere, within or without Israel.

18. Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Israeli–Arab Conflict, 1881–1999* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

19. Anita Shapira, *Israeli: A History* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2012).

20. Morris, *Righteous Victims*.

21. Ian Bickerton and Carla Klausner, *History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict* (Kansas City: University of Missouri Press, 2009).

22. Ibid.

23. Dafna Goldberg-Anavi, *Mimtsahie Seker Legabey Haplitim* [Survey Findings about the Refugees] (Tel Aviv: Geneva Initiative, 2010).

24. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, “From Taboo to the Negotiable: the Israeli New Historians and the Changing Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” *Perspectives on Politics* 5 (2007): 241–58; Lustick, “Negotiating Truth.”

25. The Zionist narrative is a historical narrative that was prevalent in Israel in the post-1948 hegemonic period, in contrast to the Zionist ideology of, generally, establishing a home for the Jews in Eretz-Israel. Since the late 1980s, the critical narrative is often called post-Zionist, because it became prevalent in Israel after the hegemonic period of the Zionist narrative.

26. By expulsion it is meant here active, direct, and forcible removal of Palestinians by Jewish/Israeli fighting forces. Flight that was caused by fear, blanket appeals from the Palestinian/Arab leadership to leave, and societal collapse is regarded here as a willing flight.

27. It should be mentioned that the critical narrative (even as supported by historian Benny Morris) is in fact similar to the Zionist narrative in claiming that the Arab/Palestinian leadership called for the Palestinians to leave their homes. The main difference is that the former narrative discusses calls for partial leave—for instance only of the elderly, women, and children and/or from specific localities, by calls not transmitted by radio, but at times by military commanders—while the latter/Zionist narrative discusses

blanket calls, typically transmitted by radio.

28. For a wider review, see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory of the Palestinian Refugee Problem," *Peace Review* 24 (2012): 187–94. All the discussion in this chapter about the presentation of the causes of the exodus, from 1949 to the present day, by the seven Israeli institutions listed below is based on the analysis of all their publications. That is these are not samples of the institutions' publications nor representative samples, but of all their publications during that period. These seven institutions are: state institutions—the National Information Center, IDF, and the Ministry of Education (for approved textbooks), and societal institutions—the research community, newspapers, war veterans' memoirs, and NGOs. See: Caplan, *The Israel–Palestine Conflict*; Uri Ram, *Israeli Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

29. Respectively, regarding the Information Center, see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli National Information Center and Collective Memory of the Israeli–Arab Conflict," *The Middle East Journal* 62 (2008): 653–70. Regarding approved textbooks, see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli Approved Textbooks and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus," *Israel Studies* 18 (2013): 41–68. Reference is made here to the textbooks designated for the national-secular system, the largest one in Israel. Regarding used textbooks, see: Ruth Firer and Sami Adwan, *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in History and Civics Textbooks of both Nations* (Hanover: Verlag Hahnsche, 2004); Eli Podeh, *The Arab–Israeli Conflict in History Textbooks (1948–2000)* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 2002).

30. Respectively, regarding the IDF, see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Army's Official Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus (1949–2004)," *War in History* (2014). Regarding the television series, see: Ya'acov Aizenman, *Amud Haesh* (Jerusalem: Broadcasting Authority, 1981).

31. Asima Ghazi-Bouillon, *Understanding the Middle East Peace Process—Israeli Academia and the Struggle for Identity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009); Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Changes in the Historical Memory of Israelis/Jews 1949–2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2011): 235–48; Ram, *Israeli Nationalism*; Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory"; Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "The Role of Direct-Experience People in Promoting Transitional Justice: The Israeli Case," in *The Performance of Memory as Transitional Justice*, ed. Elizabeth Bird and Fraser Ottanelli (Cambridge: Intersentia, forthcoming).

32. Yeoshua Porat, *Tsmichat Hatnuha Haleumit Ha'aravit-Falestininit* [The Evolution of the Arabic/Palestinian National Movement] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1976).

33. Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Changes in the Historical Memory of Israelis/Jews 1949–2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2011): 235–48. For the newspapers and the memoirs, see: Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory"; Nets-Zehngut, "The Role."

34. Caplan, *The Israel–Palestine Conflict*; Ram, *Israeli Nationalism*.

35. In general, see: Ghazi-Bouillon, *Understanding*; Ram, *Israeli Nationalism*. Regarding the historical studies, see: Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1947–51* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1992); Baruch Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel Migdal, *Palestinians—The Making of a People* (New York: Free Press, 1993); Yoav Gelber, *Palestine 1948: War, Escape, and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2001). Regarding the Lydda-Ramla Affair, see: Nets-Zehngut, "Major Events."

36. Ibid.

37. Nets-Zehngut, "Origins."

38. Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory"; Nets-Zehngut, "The Role."

39. Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory."

40. Firer and Adwan, *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*; Podeh, *The Arab–Israeli Conflict*.

41. For example, see: Moshe Carmel, *Paneya Hemeuvatim shel Milhemet Hashichrur* [The Twisted Face of the War of Independence] (Davar, 1978).

42. Aviad Kleinberg, *Tekuma—Hamishim Hashanim Harishonot* [Tekuma: The First 50 Years] (Jerusalem: The Israeli National Broadcasting Authority, the Ministry of Defense, Keter, 1998).

43. Nets-Zehngut, "Israeli Approved Textbooks."

44. Yemima Rosental, *Yitzhak Rabin: Rosh Hamemshala shel Israel 1974–1977, 1992–1995: Mivhar Mismachim Metekufot Behayav* [Yitzhak Rabin: Prime Minister of Israel 1974–1977, 1992–1995: A Selection of Documents from Periods of his Life] (Jerusalem: The Israeli National Archive, 2005).

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45. Ibid.

46. For data regarding the Israeli–Jewish popular memory survey, see: “Study Surprisingly Finds 47% of Israelis Believe that the 1948 Palestinian Refugees were Expelled by Israel,” Website of Rafi Nets-Zehngut: Academic Publications.

47. Ghazi-Bouillon, *Understanding*; Ram, *Israeli Nationalism*.

48. Firer and Adwan, *The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*; Arnon Groiss, *Jews, Israel and Peace in Palestinian School Textbooks* (New York: Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 2001); Arnon Groiss, *Jews, Israel and Peace in Palestinian School Textbooks—The New Textbooks for Grades 3 and 8* (New York: Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 2003); Arnon Groiss, *Jews, Israel and Peace in Palestinian School Textbooks—The New Textbooks for Grades 4 and 9* (New York: Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 2004); *Report I: Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum* (Jerusalem: IPCRI, 2003); *Report II: Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum* (Jerusalem: IPCRI, 2004).

49. For example, see: Yoav Gelber, *Palestine 1948: War, Escape, and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem* (Portland, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2001); Yoav Gelber, *Historiya, Zikaron Veta’amoola* [History, Memory and Propaganda] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2007); Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Eyal Nave and Ester Yogev, *Historiyot—Likrat Diyalog im Haetmol* [Histories—Towards a Dialogue with the Past] (Tel Aviv: Bavel, 2002); Asher Sasser, “Narrativim Historiim, Plitim Vesofiyut Hasichsooch” [Historical Narratives, Refugees and the Termination of the Conflict] in *Mokdei Mashber—Hamizrach Hatichon* [Crisis Centers—The Middle East] (Tel Aviv: The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle East and Africa Studies, 2004): 75–85.

50. For example, see: Saleh Abdel Jawad, “The Arab and Palestinian Narratives of the 1948 War” in *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict—History’s Double Helix*, ed. Robert Rotberg (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006): 72–114; Mustafa Kabha, *Hafalestinim—Ham Bepzurato* [The Palestinians—A Nation in the Diaspora] (Ra’anana: The Open University, 2010).

51. For example, see: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, “HaNakba: Ze Ma Shekara” [The Nakba: This is What Happened], *Alpaim* 4 (1991): 152–58; Abdulla Jaber, *Historia Haaheret* [Other History], *Mezad Shenii* 20 (1999): 16–19; Nur Masalha, “A Critique of Benny Morris,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 21 (1991): 90–97.

52. For some examples of this phenomenon, see: Mustafa Abasi, “Kibush Natsrat: Hair Ha’aravit She-sarda et Hamihama [The Arabic City that Survived the War],” *Iyunim Betkumat Israel* 20 (2010): 101–21; Farid Abdel-Nour, “Responsibility and National Memory: Israel and the Palestinian Refugee Problem,” *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17, no. 3 (2004): 339–63; Kabha, *Hafalestinim*; Sharif Kana’ana, *The Expulsion: What Really Happened in 1948—A Palestinian Response to the Zionist Historians and the New Historians* (Jerusalem: Alternative Information Center, 1991); Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); Salim Tamari, “Hivatsrut Bayat Haplitim—the Reka History [The Creation of the Refugee Problem—Historical Background],” in ed. Rafi Nets, *Haplitim Hafalestinim Vezchoot Hashiva* [The Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2004), 10–15.

53. Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Palestinian Autobiographical Memory regarding the 1948 Palestinian Exodus,” *Political Psychology* 32 (2011): 271–95.

54. Ibid.

55. Adel Yahya, *The Palestinian Refugees* (Ramallah: PACE, 1999).

56. Ephraim Yuchtman-yaar and Tamar Hermann, “How the Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish Publics Perceive the Issues?” in *The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems—New Solutions*, ed. Joseph Ginat and Edward Perkins (Portland, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2001), 303–16.

57. Steinmetz, *Rikuz Netunim Benogea Ledaat Hakaal Hafalestinim Vehaisraelit Besugiyot Haplitim Hafalestinim Vezchoot Hashiva* [Assemblage of Data with regard to the Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion regarding the Palestinian Refugees and the Right of Return] (Tel Aviv: The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, 2003).

58. There may not actually be such a significant difference between the memories of both groups; it may be that the difference found in the studies is an outcome of their timing. The West Bank and Gaza Strip survey was conducted in 1999 at the climax of the Israeli–Palestinian process when there were high expectations for the resolution of the conflict. In contrast, the Israel survey was conducted in 2003 after

the failure of the peace process and the eruption of the Second Palestinian Intifada (both in 2000). The former context supported a less self-serving narrative (unlike the Palestinian narrative), while the latter context supported a more self-serving narrative (the Palestinian one).

59. Nets-Zehngut, "Palestinian Autobiographical," Yahya, *The Palestinian Refugees*.

60. For the basis of this chapter, see: Rafi Nets-Zehngut, "Palestinians and Israelis Collaborate in Addressing the Historical Narratives of their Conflict," *Quest: Issues in Contemporary Jewish History* 5 (2013): 232–52.

61. For PRIME, see: Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, "Shared Histories Project: A PRIME Example of Peace-Building Under Fire," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 17 (2004): 513–21; Paul Scham, Walid Salem, and Benjamin Pogrund, *Shared Histories—A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue* (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2005); "Home Page," Zochrot; Robert Rotberg, *Israeli and Palestinian Narratives of Conflict: History's Double Helix* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006); Paul Scham, Benjamin Pogrund, and As'ad Ghanem, "Shared Narratives—A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue," *Israel Studies* 18, no. 2 (2013): 1–158; Sami Adwan, et al., *Zoom in: Palestinian Refugees of 1948, Remembrances* (The Hague: Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, 2011); Motti Golani and Adel Manna, *Two Sides of the Coin, Independence and Nakba* (The Hague: IHJR, 2011); IHJR, *Sacred Sites in the Holy Land: Historical and Religious Perspectives* (The Hague: Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation, 2011); Shaul Gabay and Amin Kazak, *One Land Two Stories* (New York: Livingston, 2012).

62. Nets-Zehngut, "Palestinians and Israelis."

63. It should be noted that the three surveys were conducted at different points in time (1999 and 2003 regarding the Palestinians and 2008 regarding the Israelis). Since various political and social developments occurred between 1999 and 2008, they probably influenced the popular memory of the parties. Nonetheless, it seems that especially the 2003 and 2008 surveys were conducted in a similar period. Both were conducted after the failure of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process and the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada (in contrast to the 1999 survey which was conducted in the climax of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process). Thus, the findings of these two surveys are especially more comparable.

64. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, "From Taboo to the Negotiable: The Israeli New Historians and the Changing Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007): 241–58; Lustick, "Negotiating Truth"; Sasser, "Narrativim Historiim."

65. Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Daniel Bar-Tal, "Transformation of the Official Memory of Conflicts: A Tentative Model and the Israeli Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 27, no. 1 (2014): 67–91.

66. Generally, the 1973 war reduced the trust of the Israelis towards their leaders and army because they were captured by surprise by the Egyptian army attack; the 1982 war did the same due to what was perceived as illegitimate long and deep invasion of Israel into Lebanon; and the 1987 Intifada mostly raised criticism against immoral activities conducted against the Palestinians.

67. Mustafa Kabha and Dan Caspi, *The Palestinian Arab In/Outsiders: Media and Conflict in Israel* (Portland, UK: Vallentine Mitchell, 2011).

68. Mordechai Bar-On, "Hama'avak al Zichronot Hamilchama" [The Struggle on the War's Memories], in *Milhemet Ha'atzmaut Tashach-Tashat, Diyun Mechadash* [The War of Independence, 1948–1949, Revisited], ed. Alon Kadish (Ramat Efal: Israel Galily Association, Ministry of Defense, 2004), 967–1003; Asima Ghazi-Bouillon, *Understanding the Middle East Peace Process—Israeli Academia and the Struggle for Identity* (London: Routledge, 2009); Uri Ram, *Israeli Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 2011); Nets-Zehngut, "The Israeli Memory."

69. As far as we know, there are no studies that examined the Palestinian official memory of the causes of the 1948 exodus prior to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority.

70. For example, according to a recent decision by the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, their government deviated from the approved Palestinian Authority textbooks used in the Gaza educational system. The history of the parties and their conflict was portrayed in the new textbooks in a manner that Israeli officials perceived as dangerous and provocative. Hamas explained this move as stemming from the need to ensure that future generations maintain their national rights as well as increase their nationalistic sentiments and sense of belonging. See: Fares Akram and Jodi Rudoren, "To Shape Young Palestinians,



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Hamas Creates Its Own Textbooks,” *New York Times*, November 3, 2013.

71. For example, see: Lustick, “Negotiating Truth”; Nets-Zehngut, “Palestinian Autobiographical”; Sasser, “Narrativim Historiim.”

72. Caplan, *The Israel–Palestine Conflict*. It should be mentioned that both Israeli and Palestinian scholars (forming the parties’ historical memories) felt the need to mobilize their people. The main difference is that this inclination was stronger among the former until the late 1970s while among the latter apparently until the 1990s. The reasons for the different dynamics of the two types of scholars are addressed above and below while addressing the two parties at large.

73. Mustafa Kabha, “A Palestinian Look at the New Historians and Post-Zionism in Israel,” in *Making Israel*, ed. Benny Morris (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2007), 299–319.

74. Edward Said, “New History, Old Ideas,” *Al-Abram Weekly*, May 21–27, 1998.

75. Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “Collective Self-Healing Process: The Israeli Palestinian Case,” *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* 30 (2012): 243–67.

76. Kabha, *Hafalestinim*; Kabha, “A Palestinian Look”; Tamari, “Hivatsrut.”

77. Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Daniel Bar-Tal, “The Israeli-Jewish Popular Memory of the Conflict: Survey Findings and a Suggested Model” (forthcoming).

78. Elazar Barkan, “Truth and Reconciliation in History—Introduction: Historians and Historical Reconciliation,” *American Historical Review* 114 (2009): 899–913.

